Tenancy Law

The Day the Court of Appeal Recognised… The Lawyer

In the popular imagination, the ideal trial follows a straight line: the client is right, the judge sees it, justice triumphs – curtain falls.

In reality, it is often more like climbing a winding mountain road in the rain, involving an impossible-to-find lease, a vanished jacuzzi, and printed copies of emails.

And in the middle of it all, there is one constant: the lawyer. The person who, following a disastrous first judgment, must explain to their client that “losing isn’t illegal” – and that, in fact, sometimes… it’s only the beginning of the real work.

That is precisely where the role of the lawyer comes fully into its own before the Court of Appeal: transforming a case that got off to a bad start into a structured legal argument, drawing on the relevant legal texts and jurisprudence, and finally securing a ruling from a higher court that vindicated what had initially been nothing more than a cry from the heart:

“But surely… it’s obvious I’m right!”

The Case

Let me tell you the story… 

There are cases where, after reading the first few emails, the landlord thinks, “This is an easy win.” And then there’s the legal reality. Between the two stands the lawyer. In our case, everything began as what appeared to be an entirely ordinary residential tenancy in Réunion: a monthly rent of €900, a tenant satisfied with the inventory of condition (and never challenged it), and a jacuzzi – or rather, ahem, a “spa” – purchased in 2004 for the modest sum of €6,930.10. An investment for the tenant’s comfort, but also, let’s be honest, something the landlord could proudly show off at a barbecue.

The script seems to have been written: the rent is increased, the tenant balks at this, removes the jacuzzi (without permission) but then, in a sudden fit of conscience, puts in writing that he will settle the outstanding rent and replace the “spa” with a brand-new one, describing his own proposal as “a bonus for the next tenancy.”

At this point, the landlord is convinced that all he has to do is “submit the emails” and the court will rule in his favour.

The court saw things differently. It applied the law of evidence, reminding the parties that anyone seeking to enforce an obligation must prove it (Article 1353 of the Civil Code), and that each party must prove the facts necessary to support its claim (Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

The Appeal

Revisiting the case on appeal, we focused on the validity of the tenancy agreement in the absence of a compliant written contract, the presumption arising from the absence of an inventory of condition, and the evidential value of emails as electronic records. This enabled us to overturn the trial judge’s initial interpretation by relying on the Law of 6 July 1989, which prevents a landlord from relying on the absence of a written tenancy agreement (Article 3 of the Law of 6 July 1989); on the presumption that, in the absence of an inventory of condition, the property is deemed to have been handed over in good repair (Article 1731 of the Civil Code); and on the recognition of electronic records as evidence equivalent to paper documents, provided that the author can be identified and the integrity of the document is guaranteed (Article 1366 of the Civil Code). These principles are reinforced by well-established jurisprudence recognising the validity of oral tenancy agreements and permitting their existence to be proved by any means, both in residential matters (Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, 18 September 2024, No. 23/00552) and in commercial matters (Paris Court of Appeal, 4 April 2024, No. 22/10921).

When the Written Contract Is No Longer a Weapon Against the Landlord

The trial judge in our Réunion case missed the point. No written tenancy agreement had been produced, no inventory of condition on entry, the emails were considered inconclusive, the jacuzzi delivery note did not prove that it had ever been in the property, and the burden of proof was applied with a maximalist reading of Article 1353 of the Civil Code and Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

For the landlord, it made no sense at all. How could the existence of the tenancy be denied when the tenant himself had written that he would pay the revised rent and replace the jacuzzi? How could the court disregard emails in which the occupant acknowledged removing the spa and boldly promised to install a brand-new one – “a bonus for the next tenancy”?

That is precisely where the lawyer changes the perspective before the Court of Appeal. By beginning with a simple reminder: a written contract is not a condition for the existence of a residential tenancy, but merely a requirement of proof and legal formality. The legislation says so in perfectly clear terms. The tenancy agreement must be in writing, it must comply with a standard form, and it goes on—at some length—to list all the mandatory particulars: the parties, the term, a description of the property, the rent, rent review provisions, works, and so on (Article 3 of Law No. 89-462 of 6 July 1989).

But the same provision adds a sentence that changes the evidential landscape entirely: the landlord cannot rely on a breach of that requirement. In other words, the absence of or defects in a written tenancy agreement do not render the tenancy void. They may make the tenancy harder to prove, but they do not nullify the landlord-tenant relationship. 

The Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal made this point explicitly in a case concerning an oral tenancy agreement: “Although Article 3 of the Law of 6 July 1989 provides that residential tenancy agreements must be concluded in writing, well-established jurisprudence recognises the validity of oral tenancy agreements, the existence of which may be proved by any means.” (Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, 18 September 2024, No. 23/00552)

In that case, as in ours, the tenant paid the rent, occupied the property, exchanged correspondence and lived there. On appeal, the lawyer did more than simply protest: he produced the signed residential tenancy agreement, the correspondence between the parties, the history of performance dating back to 2017, and placed the case within the established jurisprudential framework.

The Court of Appeal, for its part, had no difficulty applying the law. Where the tenant disputes neither his status as tenant, nor the rent review, nor the removal of the jacuzzi, the issue can no longer be whether the tenancy agreement existed.

What the trial judge had presented as “the absence of a contract”, the lawyer revealed to be nothing more than a missing piece of evidence. Once supplied on appeal and read alongside the relevant legal texts, it became the cornerstone of the landlord-tenant relationship.

When the “Missing” Inventory of Condition Turns Against the Tenant

The trial judge’s second argument was as follows: no inventory of condition on entry, therefore no proof of the property’s condition; no proof that the spa was there; and therefore no proof of any loss. Yet on this point, the Civil Code says precisely the opposite. Where no inventory of condition has been prepared, the tenant is presumed to have taken possession of the property in good repair and must return it in the same condition, unless the contrary is proved (Article 1731 of the Civil Code). The presumption operates in the landlord’s favour. In the absence of an inventory of condition on entry, the starting point is that the tenant took possession of the property in good condition, complete with its fixtures and fittings. If, when the tenancy ends, an item has disappeared – in this case, a jacuzzi that the tenant himself acknowledged removing in writing and promised to replace – it is no longer for the landlord to prove that it was there. It is for the tenant to prove that it never existed, that it was no longer serviceable, or that it did not form part of the tenancy.

On appeal, the lawyer therefore turns the reasoning on its head: the absence of an inventory of condition, far from being a “lack of evidence” attributable to the landlord, becomes a legal framework that requires the tenant to explain what happened to the fixtures and fittings that he had the benefit of.

And if the tenant has himself written an email admitting that he removed the jacuzzi “despite the landlord’s objection”, and proposing “new equipment” for the next tenancy, the lawyer need only set out the deduction: the presumption that the property was in good condition on entry; the acknowledged removal of the jacuzzi; the value of the spa established by invoice; the absence of any replacement; and the resulting quantified financial loss.

When this kind of evidential reasoning reaches the Court of Appeal, it ceases to be a disorganised complaint. It becomes a structured legal demonstration that the Court of Appeal can no longer simply brush aside.

When Emails Become Evidence, Not Just “Informal Discussions”

The trial judge had also dismissed the emails on the grounds that they did not clearly identify their author, did not specify “the exact amount of rent due or the rent increase applied”, and therefore lacked evidential value.

The lawyer, however, knows that French law has fully incorporated electronic records into the law of evidence. Electronic records have the same evidential value as paper documents, provided that the person from whom they originate can be identified and the integrity of the record can be guaranteed (Article 1366 of the Civil Code).

The Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal illustrated this point particularly well in a banking case, where the bank relied on DOCUSIGN certificates to prove the electronic signature of a credit agreement. The court confirmed that an electronic record is fully valid provided that the signatory can be identified and the document has been preserved in conditions guaranteeing its integrity, and it overturned the first-instance judgment, which had rejected the claim for want of a “real signature” (Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, 18 September 2024, No. 23/02521).

In our case, the tenant’s emails were not vague anonymous messages. They were sent in response to a formal notice issued by the landlord’s solicitor, originated from the email address usually used by the tenant, acknowledged the rent increase, set out a proposal for clearing the arrears, and described the arrangements for replacing the jacuzzi.

On appeal, the lawyer did more than simply “attach” them to the file. He characterised them as electronic records within the meaning of Article 1366, demonstrated the consistency between the dates and the rent schedules, and cross-referenced them with the invoices and the recorded correspondence.

In the same vein, the Paris Court of Appeal recognised the existence of an oral commercial tenancy on the basis of a body of emails, occupation of the premises and works carried out, recalling that, once commencement of performance has been established, an unwritten tenancy may be proved by any means and that it is for the judges to assess all the evidence as a whole (Paris Court of Appeal, 4 April 2024, No. 22/10921).

That shift in perspective – from the “informal” email to the “evidential” email – is, once again, the result of the lawyer’s work on appeal.

The Conclusion

When Article 700 Finally Rewards the Party in the Right

At first instance, our client not only had his claim dismissed, but was also ordered to pay the costs and was denied any award under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

For him, it was a double blow: he lost his rental income, his jacuzzi, his time—and still had to pay the costs.

For the lawyer, this is familiar territory. When Courts of Appeal overturn decisions founded on an overly rigid approach to the law of evidence, they are equally willing to revisit the question of financial fairness. In banking credit cases where the trial judge dismissed the claim for lack of sufficient evidence, the Court of Appeal regularly orders the debtor to pay, awards the principal sum claimed, and grants a substantial award under Article 700, taking the view that the party unsuccessful on appeal must bear the costs and contribute towards the legal fees incurred by the successful party (Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, 18 September 2024, No. 22/14602; Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, 18 September 2024, No. 22/17352).

Applied to our tenancy dispute, the same logic is clear. Once the tenancy agreement has been established, the presumption that the property was handed over in good repair has been recognised, the emails have been characterised, and the loss arising from the jacuzzi has been quantified, the outcome on the merits shifts. And with it, so too does the allocation of costs and the award under Article 700.

The Moral of the Story (with jacuzzi)

When the client tells you, “It’s all obvious,” they are talking about their lived experience: an agreed rent, a property that was let, a paid-for spa, and the tenant’s written commitments.

When the trial judge replies, “Nothing has been proved,” they are talking about procedural reality: the burden of proof, the formal requirements governing the production of evidence, and the need for supporting documents.

Between the two lies the work of the lawyer: tracing the tenancy agreement, structuring the emails, making the invoices speak for themselves, marshalling Article 3 of the Law of 6 July 1989, Article 1731 of the Civil Code, Articles 1353 and 9, and drawing on well-established jurisprudence recognising the validity of oral tenancy agreements and proof by any means (Article 3 of the Law of 6 July 1989, Article 1731 of the Civil Code, Article 1353 of the Civil Code, Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal, 18 September 2024, No. 23/00552, Paris Court of Appeal, 4 April 2024, No. 22/10921).

And when that legal framework is presented before the Court of Appeal, it is no longer the client’s “obvious truth” that prevails, nor the trial judge’s excessive formalism. It is the lawyer’s legal argument.

The day our client watched the Court of Appeal address each argument in turn, recognise the validity of the tenancy agreement, restore the evidential weight of the emails, and conclude that the jacuzzi was not an urban myth but an element of the loss suffered, he understood one simple thing: he had not “won because of justice”.

He won because, on appeal, justice had finally recognised the work of his lawyer.